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I. INTRODUCTION
[W]e must resolve-if not today, then soon-what is to be done in the
vast majority of other [school] districts, where, though [federal courts]
continue to profess that judicial oversight of school operations is a tem-
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porary expedient, democratic processes remain suspended, with no
prospect of restoration, 38 years after Brown v. Board of Education.'
HIS statement indicates that the role of the federal courts in supervis-
ing the hundreds of school districts involved in desegregation litiga-
tion is at a crossroads. From one perspective comes frustration with
the apparent fact that court intervention for 30 years has not succeeded.
From another direction comes a new emphasis on efficient case management
and efficient dispute resolution. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 19902 is
Congress's attempt at relieving the federal courts of the explosion of newly
created statutory rights invoking federal court jurisdiction.3 For the time
being, Congress has responded to the increase in the caseload of the federal
courts by attempting to streamline adjudication, rather than altering sub-
stantive rights.4
Finally, Congress is approaching the crossroads with plans to improve
educational performance. 5 Congress has adopted national educational goals
and initiated research; 6 making educational policy decisions, however, re-
mains a responsibility of local governments. 7 While deliberating the federal
government's role in solving local school problems, Congress also must face
claims that its Chapter I program, which is the fundamental program for
helping to improve the basic academic skills of disadvantaged children, is
failing.8 As a result, the debate on the extent of federal involvement in fun-
damental educational issues is likely to escalate.9
1. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1450 (1991) (Justice Scalia, concurring). For addi-
tional commentary on this case, see David Crump, From Freeman to Brown and Back Again:
Principle, Pragmatism, and Proximate Cause in the School Desegregation Decisions, 68 WASH.
L. REV. 753 (1993), and John Dayton, Desegregation: Is the Court Preparing to Say It Is
Finished, 84 EDUC. L. REP. 897 (1993).
2. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
3. Don J. DeBenedictis, An Experiment in Reform, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 16.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., H.R. 2460, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) [hereinafter America 2000].
6. Education Council Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-62, 105 Stat. 305 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Schools and Standards, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1993, at A22 ("If national
standards help ... to improve the quality of U.S. education, it's going to be by force of exam-
ple, not by force of federal law"); see also infra notes 17, 44, 47, 85, 120, 140, 157-59, and 180
and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., William Celis III, School Program for Poor is Failing a Panel Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1992, at A24 (disclosing the Commission on Chapter I's report entitled "Mak-
ing Schools Work for Children in Poverty"); Mary Jordan, Panel Says Poor Children Disserved
by School Aid, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1992, at AI0. For the Clinton Administration response
to these criticisms, see Mary Jordan, Writing a New Chapter in Public School Aid. More
Money Focused on Fewer Institutions, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1993, at A19.
9. Former President Bush's America 2000 legislation fell into political debate because of
the Democrats' concern that the voucher system would institutionalize de facto segregation.
Tex Lezar, School Choice Actually Saves Public Money, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 5,
1993, at A23. Despite the fact that President Clinton has opted to send his daughter to a
private school, the "choice" plans are labelled as the "cornerstone of conservative education"
reform. William Claiborne, California Votes Turn Down Proposal on School Vouchers, WASH.
POST, Nov. 4, 1993, at A25.
The recent release of a study showing that the "civil rights impulse from the 1960s is dead in
the water and the ship is floating backward toward the shoals of racial segregation" will spark
additional debate. Carol Innerst, Schools Becoming Less Integrated, WASHINGTON TIMES,
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This comment proposes that as these three forces I° - judicial frustration
with school supervision, civil justice reform, and implementation of national
educational goals - meet at the crossroads, Congress should shape these
forces into a comprehensive education plan which will: (1) bring an end to
school district supervision by the federal courts; and (2) place the responsi-
bility for ensuring equal protection in education upon the shoulders of Con-
gress rather than the federal courts."l
Before such a comprehensive education plan is enacted, Congress should
confront, in particular, constitutional limitations on its power to alter federal
court jurisdiction. 1 2 Admittedly, Congress could enact a national educa-
tional plan without addressing the propriety of continued court involvement
with school administration. Failing to address the court's role in shaping
educational policy likely will produce the same confusion that courts and
school administrators have had for thirty years in trying to implement
Brown. 
13
This comment's focus is on a constitutional issue: Whether or not Con-
gress has the power to alter the federal court's jurisdiction in school desegre-
gation cases. Section II of this comment first identifies the sources of
Congressional power to control the federal courts. After identifying the
sources of power, this comment discusses limits on the exercise of the power
itself. Section III analyzes these limits in -terms of desegregation issues.
Why Congress has not been successful in attempting to control federal court
supervision of school districts is attributable more to lack of effort than to
constitutional law.14 Yet, because of past attempts and the lapse of time in
Dec. 14, 1993, at A5 (quoting GARY ORFIELD, THE GROWTH OF SEGREGATION IN AMERI-
CAN SCHOOLS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF SEPARATION AND POVERTY SINCE 1968, NA-
TIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION (1993)).
10. There are other forces at work as well. The National Education Association, a na-
tional teachers' union, "will concentrate its national lobbying efforts in 1991 on getting more
federal money for education and a new federal statute to guarantee collective bargaining rights
for teachers." Convention Report: NEA Plan for 1991, Gov't Empi. Rel. Rep. (BNA) July 16,
1990, at 904. In addition, comparisons with other countries are putting pressure on Congress
to get more involved with education. See, e.g., National Commission on a Longer School Year,
S. Rep. No. 26, 102d Cong., 1st sess. (1991) ("Although States and localities in our country
bear the primary responsibility for elementary and secondary education, rapidly increasing
international competitiveness demands that educational achievement become a national
priority.").
11. There are many ways to demonstrate that Congress should take the lead in making
educational policy. One could attempt to reach a conclusive determination, relying on
whatever social-scientific-moral-religious theories are available. Another way is an existential
approach; the presumption that Congress must step forward to take responsibility for educa-
tion is a leap of faith from a point where basic educational systems are not performing to a
point where they might perform.
A leap of faith alone is not sufficient to recommend a change of a tradition which is as old as
the Constitution. When basic educational systems remain segregated, however, how can a
school district, drawn by arbitrary local boundaries, desegregate? See ORFIELD, supra note 9.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 31-50.
13. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown /]; Brown v. Board
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown I1]. Unless referring to one of the specific
cases, the two decisions together will hereinafter be called Brown. Brown I is the decision that
struck down the separate but equal precedent, and Brown II set forth guidelines for district
courts and school districts to follow in moving to desegregated systems of education.
14. The likely answer is that the political process itself has prevented Congress from tak-
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allowing courts to legislate Fourteenth Amendment issues, any future Con-
gressional attempt to alter federal court jurisdiction in desegregation cases
should comport with these limits. Section III proposes that Congress has
room to act depending on the appropriate result (as opposed to the remedy)
of school desegregation litigation. If the result required by the Fourteenth
Amendment is complete and idealistic desegregation, then Congress will
never be able to enact legislation which would guarantee this result. If the
result is measured practically, however, then Congress may alter the federal
court's jurisdiction of desegregation litigation and stay within constitutional
limits.
Section IV reviews Freeman to determine what result is required in school
desegregation litigation. In Freeman the Court suggests that the time has
come for federal courts to withdraw from desegregation cases.15 Then, this
comment compares the Court's philosophy revealed in Freeman with previ-
ous attempts to streamline the federal courts. From this comparison, the
comment concludes that the time has come to end federal court supervision
of school districts and suggests that Congress take control.
II. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO LIMIT FEDERAL
COURT JURISDICTION
A premise 16 of this discussion is that Congress desires to take a more ac-
tive role in implementing a national educational policy.1 7 Implementing a
national educational policy will-require Congress to alter the continuing role
of the federal courts in desegregation cases.18 The issue then becomes how
much authority does Congress have to change federal court jurisdiction.
ing measures to restrict the Court's ability to supervise school district desegregation plans.
The idea that Congress could enact legislation to control the courts' ability to fashion equitable
relief is not new. Members of Congress have tried several times to limit busing orders and
mandatory assignments along racial lines, often in opposition to remedies the courts have con-
sidered necessary to remedy the constitutional violation. See infra text accompanying notes
24, 58. These unsuccessful attempts by Congress do not necessarily reflect an absolute consti-
tutional bar to the exercise of Congress' power in Article III to affect federal court jurisdiction.
See Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determination, 40 U. CINN. L.
REV. 199, n.50 (1971).
15. See supra note 1.
16. See supra note 11.
17. This begs the question of what power Congress has to interfere with local school oper-
ations. Without going into a separate treatise, Congress would likely have the necessary power
to regulate local schools through its commerce, tax and spend, and/or Fourteenth Amend-
ment powers. See generally Laurence Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a
Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1983). Absent equal protection precedent,
however, the real issue is whether or not Congress is politically willing to infringe on tradition-
ally local affairs. See supra note 9 and infra notes 44, 47, 85, 120, 142, 157-59, and 182 and
accompanying text.
18. See JOHN C. HOGAN, THE SCHOOLS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 10
(1985). The Brown decision spurred an explosion of education litigation in the federal courts.
Between 1789 and 1956, the federal courts heard 398 cases on education issues; between 1956
and 1984, they heard over 6,999. Id.
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A. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO CONTROL FEDERAL
COURT JURISDICTION
The starting point for any discussion of Congress' power to control the
jurisdiction of the federal courts begins with Article III of the Constitu-
tion.19 Section 1 of this article establishes one Supreme Court and "such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish."'20 Like much of the Constitution, this section represents a compromise
between those wanting a strong national government and those wanting a
federation of empowered states.21 Since the framers could not agree on the
extent or the necessity of federal courts with original jurisdiction, they set-
tled on vesting Congress with the power to create courts of original jurisdic-
tion on an as-needed basis.22
A plain reading of the Constitution suggests that no constitutional limita-
tion exists to prevent Congress from eliminating federal district and appel-
late courts.23 Yet, while Congress has debated stripping the lower federal
courts of original jurisdiction, it rarely takes such action. 24 In theory, Con-
gress could end the litigation of desegregation lawsuits, as they now exist, by
stripping federal courts of original jurisdiction.25
The "exceptions clause" 26 specifically grants to Congress power to con-
trol the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Little precedent exists,
however, for anticipating how a modern court would judge a statute using
this power since Congressional exercise of the power is rare.27
19. U.S. CONST. art. III. Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower
Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974).
20. U.S. CONST. art. III § 1.
21. PAUL M. BATOR, ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 360 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER'S FEDERAL COURTS].
22. Id.
23. Daniels v. Railroad Co., 70 U.S. 250, 254 (1865) (stating that "it is for Congress to
determine how far, within the limits of the capacity of this court to take, appellate jurisdiction
shall be given, and when conferred, it can be exercised only to the extent and in the manner
prescribed by law. In these respects it is wholly the creature of legislation"). See also Martin
H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the
Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 907 (1982)
(stating that the exceptions clause is a "relatively unambiguous constitutional provision").
24. For the purposes of this comment, the most relevant Congressional debates occurred
as a result of several proposals to limit busing orders to remedy constitutional violations. See
Alphonso Bell, Congressional Response to Busing, 61 GEO. L.J. 963 (1973); Max Baucus &
Kenneth R. Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the Constitution, the Courts, and
Congress, 27 VILL. L. REV. 988 (1982); see also Charles Tiefer, The Flag-Burning Controversy
of 1989-1990: Congress' Valid Role in Constitutional Dialogue, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 357.
25. This action theoretically would shift the litigation to state courts.
26. Except for cases "affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party," the Supreme Court "shall have appellate jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 2.
27. The best known example of Congress stripping jurisdiction of the federal courts is Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869). In that case, the Supreme Court upheld an act that
removed the Court's authority to hear certain habeas corpus writs. Most commentators sug-
gest, however, that this decision is more of a product of the time period in which it was decided
(in the midst of reconstruction) than a precedent for unrestrained power by Congress to limit
federal court jurisdiction. See Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Why the Debate Over Congress'
Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Is Unending, 72 GEO. L.J. 1311 (1984).
1994] 1893
SMU LAW REVIEW
These two sections of Article III undeniably grant Congress with a broad
power to alter the judicial system of the United States. 28 Yet, the issue is
trying to define the extent of this power.29 The next section of this comment
attempts to establish the limits upon Congressional power to restrict the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts. 30
B. LIMITS ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ALTER FEDERAL
COURT JURISDICTION
The first generally accepted limit focuses on the origination of a party's
right to invoke federal court jurisdiction. 31 Different standards should apply
if an applicant to a court invokes jurisdiction based on a right created by
statute versus a right created by the Constitution.32 One commentator has
concluded:
the use by Congress of the exceptions power to single out a class of
cases involving fundamental rights, withdrawn from the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction only from dissatisfaction with the Court's
exercise of its power of substantive constitutional review in respect to
such cases, may, ironically, today be subject to fifth amendment
challenge. 33
Therefore, one limit on Article III power suggests that Congress cannot alter
the federal court's jurisdiction if a constitutional right would be made
unavailable. 34
28. Redish, supra note 23, at 901.
29. Other commentators have identified "internal limits" such as the "essential functions"
thesis and the "limitation-as-to-fact theory." Redish, supra note 23, at 906-13. The "essential
functions," which cannot be invaded by Congressional fiat, provide: 1) "a tribunal for the
ultimate resolution of inconsistent or conflicting interpretations of federal law by state and
federal courts," and 2) "a tribunal for maintaining the supremacy of federal law when it con-
flicts with state law or is challenged by state authority." Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional
Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 161
(1960). In other words, "the 'essential functions' thesis is little more than constitutional wish-
ful thinking." Redish, supra note 23, at 911. The "limitation-as-to-fact" theory suggests that
the words "with such Exceptions" modifies only the word "Fact" and not "appellate Jurisdic-
tion" in article III. Professor Redish concludes that McCardle "clearly disposes of the review-
as-to-fact theory, since the limitation on the Court's appellate jurisdiction upheld there was in
no way confined to review of factual determinations." Id. at 914-15.
30. Since little case law exists on this point, it is necessary to rely on theories put forth by
constitutional scholars.
31. In McCardle the Supreme Court upheld a law which repealed a statutory right of
appeal. 74 U.S. at 509.
32. See United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393 ("What such exceptions and regulations
should be it is for Congress, in its wisdom, to establish, having, of course, due regard to all the
provisions of the Constitution."). Stated another way, "to push the Congressional power to
withhold jurisdiction to the extreme of permitting constitutional rights to be made completely
unenforceable would be to read the basic document as authorizing its own destruction." Bell,
supra note 24, at 969; see Redish, supra note 23, at 915-16 (finding that the due process clause
of article V "requires an independent judicial forum for the ultimate adjudication of claims of
constitutional right").
33. William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARiz. L. REV.
229, 265 (1973).
34. Cf Redish, supra note 23, at 917 ("[I]f all Congress has done is to remove a class of
cases involving assertion of a particular right from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction,
and has done so for everyone, there would not even appear to exist a prima facie equal protec-
1894 [Vol. 47
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The second limit that is most often mentioned is the foundation of the
constitution itself - the separation of powers. 35 If Congress possessed the
power to cripple the effectiveness of the judicial branch of the government,
the people and the states would have no protection from the acts of Con-
gress. 36 The case law on this point, however, is sparse. 37 Nonetheless, few
would argue that Congress has the power to "eliminate entirely the courts'
function of preserving fourteenth amendment rights."'38
The third limit appears in Klein.39 In that case, the Supreme Court "re-
fused to sustain a statutory withdrawal of Court jurisdiction on the grounds
that it was an improper congressional attempt to prescribe the result in a
pending case."'' 4 This limit prohibits Congress from enacting legislation
which would require an improper result in a pending controversy.
That none of these limits prevent Congress from taking action should be
noted. The reason Congress has not, or will not, become the primary educa-
tional policy maker is out of respect for the tradition that schools are to be
controlled on a local level. If the Court decided to abandon Brown, desegre-
gation proponents would have only the political system as a forum for debat-
ing the merits of desegregated education.41 Thus the question becomes
"who should have authority to shape the education of future citizens." 42 If
education "involves the social reproduction of culture" and "cultures are, by
their nature, culturally biased," can democratic education really prepare stu-
dents to understand "equality of citizenship?" 43 The answers to these ques-
tions require more than philosophical answers; they require a policy
determination. If Congress decides to maintain the country's long-standing
position that "[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted
than local control over the operation of schools,"44 then the puzzle of how a
tion problem, assuming no clear, disproportionate impact and no demonstration of an ultimate
legislative purpose to single out a particular group for negative treatment.").
35. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Well.) 128, 147 (1871) ("Congress has inadver-
tently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power"). Redish supra
note 23, at 923-24; see also Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review:
Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982).
36. Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 507.
37. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 541 (1962) ("Congress may not by fiat
overturn the constitutional decisions of this Court .... "); see also Redish, supra note 23, at 903
("[A] discussion of the relevant case law concerning past congressional efforts to curb Supreme
Court jurisdiction ... proves to be far from definitive, and ultimately aids the inquiry very
little").
38. Bell, supra note 24, at 970.
39. 80 U.S. 128.
40. Bell, supra note 24, at 969 n.55.
41. Relying solely on this limit would be a radical departure from the active role currently
played by the courts. One reason suggested for resorting to the political process is that in "the
post-World War II era, the engine for school reform was driven by ideology of equal educa-
tional opportunity" but now the issue is more "excellence than equality." Mark G. Yudof,
Should We Move Beyond Tolerance? Examining Education and American Multiculturalism,
TEXAS LAW., Oct. 29, 1990, at 18.
42. Id. at 19.
43. Id.
44. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974); see also Christopher Steskal, Creating




local culture which has exhibited discriminatory tendencies, can teach its
children not to discriminate, is more difficult to solve.45 If educational poli-
cies are federally mandated and not subject to local control or veto, however,
the potential for instilling new values into a local culture is greater.46
The Warren Court established itself in the country's mind as the preemi-
nent policy maker for educational equality issues. Whether the Court would
have been faced with Brown if Congress had assumed a more prominent role
in protecting equal protection rights is mere speculation. Thirty years of
hindsight, however, show that the courts are not suited to be an educational
policy maker.47
While the amount of commentary on the congressional authority to limit
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, both generally and specifically on Four-
teenth Amendment questions, is extensive, 48 little precedent exists to sup-
port the myriad of theories advanced by scholars.49 If Congress enacted a
statute to alter the federal courts' jurisdiction, however, and the statute did
not exceed the limits mentioned above, presumably the statute would be
constitutional. 50
III. OVERCOMING THE LIMITS: A FRAMEWORK
FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO CHANGE
FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION IN
DESEGREGATION LITIGATION
A. STEP #1: PRESERVING EQUAL PROTECTION
As mentioned above, one limitation on Congressional authority to alter
federal court jurisdiction is the requirement that constitutional rights remain
protected. Therefore, any congressional alteration of federal jurisdiction of
pending or future desegregation cases, regardless of the statutory or consti-
tutional origin of the claim, may not retreat from any relevant constitutional
guarantee.
In Brown Chief Justice Warren announced that dual educational systems,
based on race and sanctioned by state law or action, violate the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5' The first step then for Con-
45. Yudof, supra note 41, at 18.
46. Id.
47. Even the Supreme Court recognized this assertion:
[W]e stand on familiar grounds when we continue to acknowledge that the Jus-
tices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems
so necessary to the making of wise decisions .... In such a complex arena in
which no perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigor-
ous a standard of scrutiny.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973).
48. Bell, supra note 24, at 969.
49. For example, one commentator belittled Klein because it "cannot easily be reconciled
with the well-established principle that appellate courts are obliged to follow changes in the
law enacted during the pendency of an appeal." See Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 526. He
concludes that "the safest reading of Klein is that it precludes Congress from impairing the
Executive's power to pardon." Id. at 526-27.
50. Cox, supra note 14, at 260.
51. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.
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gress is to protect an individual's right to equal protection of educational
laws. Accordingly, Congress may not inhibit that right through use of its
powers to alter federal court jurisdiction.52
Using the Brown I holding as a starting point for developing a minimum
constitutional national education plan is not, today, revolutionary. 53 Con-
gress and the American people have, except for a few extremists, accepted
that systems of dual education based on race are unconstitutional. There-
fore, Congress could readily enact and enforce legislation to prohibit inten-
tional state acts of segregation.54
This first step also should satisfy the first limit on Congressional authority
to limit federal court jurisdiction - that no state may abrogate a constitu-
tional right. By relying on the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,5 5 Congress can legislate equal protection issues. 56 If federal
legislation guaranteed the individual's right to equal protection as inter-
preted by Brown, then the legislation should, on its face, be constitutional.
B. STEP #2: PROVIDING A FORUM FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The second step requires that the legislation maintain an opportunity for
the federal courts to be the ultimate arbiter of constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court has consistently maintained that it alone determines what
the law is, and any legislation which would prevent it from making constitu-
tional determinations would not survive judicial scrutiny. s7
In the context of desegregation litigation, Congress' previous attempts to
alter federal jurisdiction focused on circumventing judicial review rather
than providing for equal protection of rights. This approach not only ex-
ceeds the doctrine of separation of powers by attempting to remove the fed-
eral court's power to define the contours of the Fourteenth Amendment, but
it also implicates the Klein limit by attempting to improperly prescribe the
52. See Cox, supra note 14, at 217-24.
53. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Recon-
struction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REV.
349, 353 (1990).
During the late 1950's and early 1960's, Brown was simultaneously simple, opti-
mistic, and naive. Its uncomplicated demand for formal equality was made with
the confident assumption - credulous, it is true, given the nation's history, but
perhaps excusably so given the period's flush economic conditions - that noth-
ing more than abolishing 'separate but equal' was needed to end the subordina-
tion of black Americans.
Id.
54. In fact, Congress has already enacted this sort of legislation. See 20 U.S.C. § 122 1-1
(1988):
Recognizing that the Nation's economic, political, and social security require a
well-educated citizenry, the Congress (1) reaffirms, as a matter of high priority,
the Nation's goal of equal educational opportunity, and (2) declares it to be the
policy of the United States of America that every citizen is entitled to an educa-
tion to meet his or her full potential without financial barriers.
Id.
55. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
56. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 330-50 (2d ed. 1988).
57. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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result in a pending case.58 Other approaches will allow Congress to enact
national education legislation and provide proper judicial review.
For example, the Department of Education allows claimants to challenge
administrative decisions. The first step is a review of the claim by an admin-
istrative law judge. 59 A claimant does not, however, have to accept the ad-
ministration's determination; review by an Article III court is available. 6°
In addition, legislation allowing other agencies to use administrative law
judges provides for either concurrent or appellate jurisdiction by an Article
III court. 61 Nonetheless, any legislation that might alter the courts' role in
articulating the Fourteenth Amendment deserves special attention. 62
For example, the record of the States and Congress in complying with the
Court's definition of the Fourteenth Amendment in the school desegregation
context is notable for one reason - the amazing show of opposition to the
Court at every turn.6 3 Therefore, the Court should approach suspiciously
the subject of Congress requiring the courts to defer to legislation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Despite Congress' past opposition to the Court's
desegregation rulings, the Court has deferred review of the constitutional
issues because the constitutional challenge presents a "political question."
64
The political question doctrine is not a sufficient basis for removing federal
court jurisdiction, however, because usually a politically motivated decision
by a state actor precipitates the cause of action in the first place.65
In other constitutional cases, the Supreme Court has adopted a "presump-
tion of constitutionality."' 66 The reason for this presumption is that the "as-
certainment and characterization of facts, even when constitutionally
decisive, may be a job for the legislature rather than the judiciary."'67 In
desegregation litigation, Congress has rarely used its superior fact-finding
58. See supra notes 14 and 24.
59. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1234, 1708 and 2834 (1988).
60. Id.
61. The conclusion that the creation of any legislative court is constitutional glosses over
significant legal issues that exceed the scope of the Comment. See, e.g., Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line, 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Nonetheless, with the passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990, the bright line between Article III courts and legislative courts is beginning to dull.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. IV 1992).
62. In theory, Congress could abolish lower federal courts, which would have the effect of
either shifting desegregation to state courts or ending the litigation entirely. This drastic step
would ignore, however, other constitutional issues such as providing a check on the other two
branches of government, in order to achieve "uniformity of decision on questions of national
concern ... [and to] ensure that federal interests take precedence over those of any particular
state in matters of federal competence." Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 504-05.
Strict review is also required because of the sensitive nature of the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. For example, South Africa does not permit its courts "to enquire
into or to pronounce upon the validity of any Act passed upon by Parliament." Laurence H.
Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights out of the Federal Courts, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129, 131 (1981). This implies that a weak court would never be able
to secure equal protection of the laws.
63. See supra notes 14, 24, and 58 and accompanying text.
64. Cox, supra note 14, at 201-06.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
66. Cox, supra note 14, at 208.
67. Id. at 207.
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function to resolve desegregation issues. 68
Another possibility is to require state courts to adjudicate constitutional
claims. 69 The problem with this approach is two-fold: (1) if Congress en-
acted national education legislation, the legislation would be subject to fifty
varying interpretations; and (2) state court judges are more likely to be bi-
ased in a local school district case than are federal judges.70 Despite these
problems, it is not per se unconstitutional for Congress to withdraw jurisdic-
tion of federal district courts. 71
Even though the Court has dodged the ultimate question of whether Con-
gress can withdraw jurisdiction and potentially leave constitutional rights
without protection, the Court will always have jurisdiction to decide
whether the jurisdiction is constitutional. 72 Consequently, the mechanics of
providing or not providing jurisdiction is swallowed by the issue of protect-
ing a constitutional right. In other words, the question is not whether Con-
gress can withdraw jurisdiction, but what happens when it does: Did
Congress provide for the proper result.
C. STEP #3: PROVIDING FOR A PROPER RESULT
The third step that Congress should consider is the result that the equal
protection clause guarantees to individuals who have suffered from unlawful
segregation. 73 In this third step, Congress also must stay within the third
limit discussed above - the purpose of the legislation must not be to im-
properly "prescribe the result in a pending case."' 74 To do this, Congress
must determine the proper consequence of violating the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If the legislation required a result
different from that which a court would order, then the legislation would not
meet the Klein limitation. This third step, then, involves analyzing the sig-
nificant Supreme Court decisions to identify the proper result for school de-
segregation litigation.75
68. The absence of a fact-finding process in Brown is cited as a reason for the Court's
"espousing highly questionable social propositions." Id. at 209.
The opinion in Brown v. Board of Education would have been far more persua-
sive if it had asserted the political proposition that a State cannot be the govern-
ment of all the people if it supports a caste system by racial segregation, instead
of invoking the writings of controversial sociologists to the effect that segregated
schools hamper the education of black children - a proposition that may be
true or false or partly true and partly false but which the Court had neither the
time to investigate nor the qualifications to decide.
Id.
69. Cox, supra note 14, at 258.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 259.
72. HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 21, at 423.
73. It is important to remember that segregation is not always unlawful.
74. Bell, supra note 24, at 969 n.55.
75. This process, in a strict sense, is impossible. There have been so many interpretations
of the meaning of Brown that any attempt to restate actual principles of law will not address
the confusion created in implementation of the law. That is, Brown represents a general princi-
ple upon which are built a myriad of specific court decrees based on particular facts. It is not
uncommon for the specific decree to be inconsistent with the general principle. For legislation
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1. Setting the Stage: Brown Provides No Real Guidance
At the heart of any review of Brown and its progeny is the tension between
lawful and unlawful segregation.76 A violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment results from either state sanctioned dual educational systems or inten-
tional acts of segregation by the state.77 Therefore, de jure (by force of law)
segregation is actionable, but private acts of segregation are not. 78 This di-
chotomy has frustrated the courts' attempts at fashioning remedies which
actually desegregate schools. 79 Since the court's authority was limited to the
enforcement of desegregation plans on the parties to the case, private indi-
viduals who sought to escape integration were not affected.80 Therefore, in-
terpretation of equal protection by the courts has, in effect, created
conflicting rights for individuals in seeking an education. On the one hand,
the Court states that victims of segregation are entitled to a remedy, while,
on the other hand, every parent has the choice of selecting the school for his
to be successful, the specifics of an appropriate plan based on the best method for educating all
students should be built first. From the specific plan will evolve the general principle. It is
probable, then, that any attempt by Congress to establish a uniform system of any kind will be
subject to attack as a violation of the general principle set forth by Brown. Just as the Supreme
Court has allowed a significant amount of district court discretion in applying the general
principle, however, so should Congress be allowed some lee-way in developing a consistent
application of the general principle.
76. Many argue that the rationale used by Chief Justice Warren to create a new constitu-
tional right in Brown I and Brown II had no legal precedent. These arguments are interesting
but, to a degree, moot. It is farfetched to think that now, 30 years later, that any Court would
find that "separate but equal" is constitutional.
77. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
78. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977). See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE
L.J. 585, 592 (1983).
79. The choice the Court made by selecting "all deliberate speed" as the method to initi-
ate integration is often cited as promoting resistance to the desegregation movement. Gewirtz,
supra note 78, at 613. Professor Gewirtz also quoted a portion of Thurgood Marshall's oral
argument in Brown II to support this argument:
[T]he argument [to postpone enforcement of a constitutional right] is never
made until Negroes are involved.
And then for some reason this population of our country is constantly asked,
"Well, for the sake of the group that has denied you these rights all of this
time," . . . to protect their greatest and most cherished heritage, that the Ne-
groes should give up their rights.
Gewirtz, supra note 78, at 613 (quoting ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA 1952-55 525 (Leon Fried-
man ed.,1969)); see also Louis Lusky, The Stereotype: Hard Core Racism, 13 BUFF. L. REV.
450, 457-59 (1964).
80. Nonetheless, Professor Gewirtz argues that
white flight itself is an effect of the original de jure segregation, and therefore
segregated attendance patterns resulting from flight are an effect of the original
violation.... Because long-standing segregation may well have contributed to
the conditions and attitudes that make whites want to flee the public school
system, white flight can be characterized as an effect of the original segregation
for which the defendant is responsible.
Gewirtz, supra note 78, at 640. Despite making these statements, Gewirtz nonetheless recog-
nizes that even if white-flight is symptomatic of de jure segregation, an individual's decision to
avoid the reach of the court by moving elsewhere is not subject to injunction and is protected
by the constitution. Id.
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or her child.8 1 In other words, it is illegal for a state actor to intentionally
segregate children in schools by race, but it is not illegal if segregation natu-
rally occurs because of individual voluntary movement.
The implication of the de jure and de facto dichotomy is that a significant
causation factor is beyond the reach of the courts. Instead of acknowledging
the reasonable possibility that no court order would ever improve attempts
to desegregate, the Court moved further into the realm of establishing educa-
tional policy.
2. The Duty to Desegregate
Determining what result Brown requires by law is difficult and courts have
struggled with this for more than three decades. "[T]he desegregation deci-
sions that followed Brown I... have with reason been described as 'patch-
work of unintelligibility,' 'chaos out of confusion,' and 'surrealistic.' "82
"Heeded differently, however, Brown's meaning need not be discerned from
the discordant messages the decision seems to voice and instead may be
descri[b]ed [sic] in the changing tenor of the times through which the deci-
sion has lived."'83
Beginning in 1954, the Supreme Court proclaimed that "in the field of
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place" and "is a
denial of the equal protection of the laws."' 84 Because of the "wide applica-
bility of this decision and because of the great variety of local conditions,
85
the Court requested the parties to present further argument on "the consid-
eration of appropriate relief."
'86
Therefore, in Brown I the Court did not specify what the result should be
for violating the Fourteenth Amendment, except that states must dismantle
dual systems of education. Brown 1187 does not help either. After rehearing
arguments on the appropriate relief, the Court remanded the cases to the
district courts "[b]ecause of [the court's] proximity to local conditions and
the possible need for further hearings." 88 In fashioning equitable remedies,
the Court noted that district courts should reconcile "public and private
needs," 89 the private needs being "the personal interest of the plaintiffs in
being admitted to public schools as soon as practicable and on a non-dis-
criminatory basis." 90 This vague instruction to the district courts has caused
81. Liebman, supra note 53, at 352.
82. Liebman, supra note 53, at 352 (citing Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal
Realism, Reasoned Elaboration and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 87, 99, 102, 105 (1978)). See also Liebman, supra note 53, at 353 n.20
("[M]ore than 30 years after the Brown decision there is no political or intellectual consensus
about where we are, what we have learned or where we should be going.").
83. Liebman, supra note 53, at 353.
84. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
88. Id. at 299.




decades of confusion about the role of the courts in supervising school deseg-
regation plans. However, looking back at the decision attempting to define
what the result should be, one theme stands out - practicality. 91 That is, the
courts are reminded several times to remain cognizant of the practical
problems inherent in operating a school district.
While Brown and its progeny have succeeded in changing the mindset of
most Americans, these cases have not succeeded necessarily in improving
educational opportunities for the victims of de jure segregation, and, espe-
cially, for the victims of de facto segregation. 92 Furthermore, the dichotomy
created by Brown between state actors who permitted dual educational sys-
tems in 1954 and those state actors who had instituted alleged integrated
systems has outlived its purpose. The same afflictions which prevent one
urban school system not under court supervision from improving achieve-
ment are generally the same afflictions which impede progress in school sys-
tems that are under court supervision. 9 3
The issue becomes how Congress can overcome this legal hurdle of ad-
dressing past constitutional violations which, if tested by the courts, would
pass constitutional muster. The answer should be that if the legislation pro-
vides for programs which will produce a proper result for a constitutional
violation, the Court should find the legislation acceptable to compensate for
past violations. This answer is, however, easier stated than applied. One of
the basic principles of equity jurisprudence is that a court should not con-
sider equitable remedies if legal remedies are adequate. 94 Accordingly, if
Congress can fashion an educational program which serves as a remedy for
both past and future violations, the courts' ability to single-handedly fashion
equitable relief should be diminished significantly, 95 if not eliminated
entirely.
If Brown were the only case interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, the
limitation on Congress to legislate equal protection issues would not be as
91. The theme originated in Brown II when the Court referred to its equity powers as
being "a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies." Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300. Over time,
however, "flexibility" became the dominant trait of equitable remedies, as an arsenal of ideas
were thrown at educational problems with the hopes that one theory would stick. Even
though the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990), expressed concern that
Kansas City's desegregation plan "as a practical matter raises many of the concerns," the
Court did not invalidate drastic remedies to improve "the quality of education to attract
nonminority students." Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 76, 78.
92. See Christine H. Rossell, Applied Social Science Research: What does It Say About the
Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans?, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 80-91 (1983). Rossell
concludes, "[t]he average court ordered desegregation plan ... results, on average, in an addi-
tional white enrollment loss of 8-10 percentage points in the year of implementation." Id. at
105. Rossell further states that opposition to desegregation plans "can have serious conse-
quences for student achievement and race relations either directly through their effect on at-
tendance and in-school behavior or indirectly through their effect on white flight and
polarization of community attitudes." Id. See also Gewirtz, supra note 78, at 629.
93. As of 1988, more than a hundred cases were being litigated actively in federal courts.
Current Status of Federal School-Desegregation Lawsuits, EDUC. WK., June 1, 1988, at 18-19.




significant. During the 1960's and 1970's, however, the courts increasingly
expanded a school district's duty to achieve the proper result.
If the states, and even Congress, had reacted to Brown by supporting vol-
untary integration, instead of creating roadblocks to the disestablishment of
dual educational systems, many of the problems created by court supervision
of school districts might not have occurred. 96 As a result of this institutional
entrenchment to oppose judicial orders, the Court responded by expanding
the duty of school districts to devise constitutional plans and by increasing
the responsibility of the district courts to retain jurisdiction of cases until
desegregation occurred.
In Green v. County School of New Kent County97 the Court faced its last
easy fact situation. New Kent County Virginia had only two schools in the
entire county, one for blacks and one for whites. For several years after
Brown, the school district did little to dismantle its dual educational system,
and the State of Virginia prohibited a school district's changing attendance
zones without state approval. Finally, in order to retain federal education
funding, the school board adopted a "freedom-of-choice" plan. No white
students chose the black school and very few black students chose the white
school. In effect, ten years after Brown, New Kent County still operated a
dual system of education.
Faced with a recalcitrant school board, the Court held that "[t]he burden
on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realis-
tically to work, and promises realistically to work now."'98 The Court sent
the parties back to the district court to develop a new plan, despite acknowl-
edging that "[t]here is no universal answer to complex problems of desegre-
gation; there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every case." 99
Despite this caveat, the Court made it clear that the result or "ultimate end"
of desegregation litigation is to create a "unitary, nonracial system of public
education."1°°
In Raney v. Board of Education'0 1 the Court held that a district court
should "retain jurisdiction until it is clear that disestablishment has been
achieved"' 0 2 and until the goal of "a desegregated, non racially operated
school system is rapidly and finally achieved. ' 103 Therefore, going into the
1970's, school districts were faced with the overwhelming task of creating
desegregation plans which not only dismantled dual systems of education
but also created racially balanced systems of education.
96. See Chafee Scores Failure to Plan Desegregation, HARV. L. REV., Jan. 31, 1957, at 1,
4.
97. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
98. Id. at 439.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 436.
101. 391 U.S. 443 (1968).
102. Id. at 449.
103. Id. (quoting Kelley v. Altheimer, 378 F.2d 483, 489 (8th Cir. 1967)).
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3. Creating the Paradox
The Court continued to operate in an environment of public opinion
fiercely opposed to desegregation plans requiring involuntary student assign-
ments.1' Nonetheless, the imperative of Green was clear - a school district
had to come up with a plan that promised, realistically, to work immedi-
ately. The obvious solution was forced busing.
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education105 the Court ap-
proved busing as an appropriate remedy and the white-flight race began. 106
Not only did the scope of remedies to achieve desegregation begin to expand,
the class of potential defendants also enlarged.
The Keyes 107 case dealt with a school district that, as a result of an elec-
tion sweeping out proponents of desegregation, in a certain area of Denver
intentionally maintained segregated schools.10 8 In addition, the Court found
that segregated inner city schools were educationally inferior to the mostly
white schools in other parts of the city. The court of appeals, however, "dis-
regarded respondent School Board's deliberate racial segregation policy re-
specting the Park Hill schools and accepted the District Court's finding that
petitioners had not proved that respondent had a like policy addressed spe-
cifically to the core city schools."' 10 9 The primary issue was the extent to
which an intentional segregative act affecting one area of the school district
(Park Hill) could be used as proof to establish intentional segregation in
another area (the inner city). The Court held that where there is a "system-
atic program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students,
school, teachers, and facilities within the school system, it is only common
sense to conclude that there exists a predicate for a finding of the existence
of a dual school system." 110 This predicate created a rebuttable presump-
tion of "unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities, and
shift[ed] to those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated
schools within the system [were] not also the result of intentionally segrega-
104. Ironically,
the Brown decision was aimed primarily at ending the shameful practice of bus-
ing black students past white schools in order to maintain racial segregation.
Today many black students find themselves bused past black schools to main-
tain integration - and their parents are no more pleased with this system than
their forebears were pleased with the old one.
Clarence Page, Re-examining the Old Solutions, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 27, 1991, at C3.
105. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
106. Gewirtz, supra note 78, at 634.
107. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
108. Id. at 192.
The District Court found that by the construction of a new, relatively small
elementary school, Barrett, in the middle of the Negro community west of Park
Hill, by the gerrymandering of student attendance zones, by the use of so-called
'optional-zones,' and by the excessive use of mobile classroom units, among
other things, the respondent School Board had engaged over almost a decade
after 1960 in an unconstitutional policy of deliberate racial segregation with re-
spect to the Park Hill schools.
Id.
109. Id. at 195.
110. Id. at 201.
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tive actions."'11 I This case did not add to defining the appropriate result, but
it expanded the group of potential defendants to include even those who did
not have de jure systems of segregation at the time the Court decided Brown.
In Milliken v. Bradley 112 the Court provided its most elaborate discussion
of remedial and compensatory education programs as remedies for constitu-
tional violations. The issue in that case was "whether a District Court can,
as part of a desegregation decree, order compensatory or remedial educa-
tional programs for schoolchildren who have been subjected to past acts of
de jure segregation." ' 1 3 Seven years earlier these same parties had been
before the Supreme Court. 1 4 In Milliken I the Supreme Court reversed a
district court determination that only a metropolitan desegregation plan (as
opposed to an intradistrict plan), consisting of fifty-four school districts,
would effectively desegregate the schools. 1 5 After the Court's reversal, the
parties labored for six years to desegregate a system which was 71.5%
black. 1' 6 The Detroit Board of Education proposed a plan which included,
in addition to student reassignments, thirteen remedial or compensatory ed-
ucational programs. 117 Of these thirteen programs, only four were at issue
before the Court-inservice training for teachers and administrators, gui-
dance and counseling programs, revised testing procedures, and a remedial
reading and communications skills program." 8 Instead of providing an in-
dependent assessment of whether these programs satisfy Green - desegregate
now, the Court discussed the equitable powers of the district court to fashion
remedies based on the extent of the constitutional violation. In other words,
if the district court found these programs were appropriate to remedy the
violation, then the Supreme Court would not disturb the findings. Since the
Court had struck down the previous interdistrict plan, the options available
to the lower court were limited. Therefore, beginning with Milliken II, re-
medial and compensatory education programs were given new prominence
as a desegregation remedy. This shift in remedies also moved the appropri-
ate result from racial population balancing to improving educational per-
formance for those who suffered from the constitutional violation.
The paradox was beginning to take shape. As private acts of segregation
began to diminish the populations capable of being desegregated, the school
districts' duty to desegregate increased. Instead of recognizing white-flight
I 11. Id. at 208.
112. 433 U.S. 267 (1977) [hereinafter Milliken I].
113. Id. at 269.
114. Milliken v. Bradley, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) [hereinafter Milliken I].
115. Id. at 24. School district boundaries are sacred even though they are entirely arbitrary
dividing lines, in most cases. These arbitrary lines, when tested by common sense, often fail
logic. For example, in Connecticut, the state brought a suit against one city to end racial and
ethnic segregation, where the segregation is within the current boundaries of the city; and the
state is being sued for opposing an attempt to integrate another city, whose schools are more
than ninety percent black and Latino, with the city's overwhelmingly white suburban neigh-
bors. Carole Bass, State Position on School Desegregation: Two Cases, Two Faces, CONN. L.
TRIB., Aug. 5, 1991, at I.
116. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 271.
117. Id. at 272.
118. Id. at 272-73.
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as a contributing cause of segregation and as an impediment to achieving
desegregation, the Court shifted its focus to shaping remedies which pro-
vided compensatory education programs to the victims of past segregation.
The paradox took final form once the Court created obstacles for impos-
ing interdistrict remedies. If, as the result of white-flight, a school district
did not have a sufficient number of racially diverse students to create a ra-
cially balanced school system, it is logical to take the position that the school
district created by the white-flight should be joined in the lawsuit. The
Court blocked this remedy, however, because the newly created school dis-
trict had not violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1979, the Supreme
Court decided two cases on the same day, Columbus Board of Education v.
Penick'19 and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman.120 The defendants
in both cases, Ohio school districts, had allegedly failed to discharge their
duties to eliminate their dual systems of education.
In Dayton II the defendant school district sought to overturn the district
court's determination that, although "the Dayton schools were highly segre-
gated[,]... the Board's failure to alleviate this condition was not actionable
absent sufficient evidence that the racial separation had been caused by the
Board's own purposeful discriminatory conduct." 121 Previously, the court
of appeals reversed two district court desegregation orders for having limited
remedial objectives.122 Then, the district court ordered the school board to
take "the necessary steps to assure that each school in the system would
roughly reflect the systemwide ratio of black and white students."'1 23 In
Dayton 1124 the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court be-
cause "there was no warrant for imposing a systemwide remedy."' 125 On
remand, the district court held an extensive evidentiary hearing and, based
on the court's findings of fact and law, dismissed the complaint. Conse-
quently, some six years after the plaintiffs filed the original complaint, the
case had proceeded through the system once and was about to go before the
Supreme Court for the second time.
4. Past Sins Are Not to Be Forgotten
The issue in Dayton II was whether the court of appeals correctly deter-
mined that the district court made clearly erroneous findings of fact and
law.' 26 The most important finding in dispute was whether the defendants
"were intentionally operating a dual school system in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 127 The Court, without
much detail, affirmed the court of appeals, and then proceeded to discuss the
119. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
120. 443 U.S. 526 (1979) [hereinafter Dayton I].
121. Dayton H, 443 U.S. at 532.
122. Id. at 530.
123. Id. at 531.
124. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) [hereinafter Dayton 1].
125. Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 531.




duty of a school district who has violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 128
The Court stated that "[g]iven intentionally segregated schools in 1954....
[a school board is] thereafter under a continuing duty to eradicate the effects
of that system." 129 The measure of whether a school district has met this
duty "to liquidate a dual system is the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the
actions in decreasing or increasing the segregation caused by the dual sys-
tem."' 130 This case indicates that the proper result for violating the Four-
teenth Amendment is an effective implementation of a plan which actually
desegregates the school system. The Court offers no hope for good-faith but
unsuccessful implementation.
In Penick the Court addressed whether the Columbus Public Schools
should be required to institute a "systemwide" desegregation plan.' 3' The
complaint in this case was filed in June 1973. The trial began a year later,
"consumed 36 trial days, produced a record containing over 600 exhibits and
transcript in excess of 6,600 pages, and was completed in June 1976."132 In
March 1977, the district court found that the Columbus Public Schools
''were openly and intentionally segregated on the basis of race when Brown
was decided in 1954."133 The school district argued that "whatever uncon-
stitutional conduct it may have been guilty of in the past such conduct at no
time had any systemwide segregative impact and surely no remaining sys-
temwide impact at the time of trial."1 34 The Court rejected this argument
because the findings of the district court indicated that characteristics of the
previous dual system of education remained and the school district has a
continuing obligation to eradicate "all vestiges of that dual system."1 35
Again, the Court's emphasis was on eradication of all vestiges of past unlaw-
ful segregation, not on good faith attempts.
5. Appropriate Result: Ideal or Practical
After reviewing these cases, is it possible for Congress to enact legislation
changing the courts' jurisdiction which will not violate Klein and prescribe
the result of a constitutional violation? The answer depends on which one of
two interpretations is selected for defining the appropriate result for a consti-
tutional violation. One interpretation, for simplicity's sake called the idealis-
tic interpretation, requires any remedy which has not completely and
permanently removed all vestiges of unlawful segregation to be considered
incomplete and unlikely to produce the appropriate result. The idealistic
interpretation does not weigh good faith compliance; it measures the result
by the effectiveness of the remedy ordered.
128. Id. at 537-40.
129. Id. at 537.
130. Id. at 538.
131. 443 U.S. at 453.
132. Id.
133. Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ. 429 F. Supp. 229, 260 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
134. Penick, 443 U.S. at 454-55. This argument sounds like the one used by the school




The other approach, the realistic interpretation, recognizes the paradox in
the law which permits remedies to address public acts of discrimination but
does not permit remedies to address private acts of discrimination. There-
fore, the law cannot completely remedy the constitutional violation because
private acts are a realistic impediment to achieving the idealistic result. 136
D. THE IDEALISTIC RESULT - A FAILED GOAL AND A
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION TO CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
The courts have done more for desegregation than any other branch of
government or state, but the courts have reached their limit. The limit is not
one in the law; it is an organizational limit. The judiciary has never been
equipped to undertake the enormous task of implementing reform.
The preceding analysis of several cases indicates the courts' willingness to
continue ordering remedies until an appropriate result is obtained. This
willingness has made many courts the authorizing agent for new educational
programs. Courts will often strike down state laws that may impede imple-
mentation of a remedy aimed at achieving the ideal result.1 37 This raw
power is often attractive to the defendant school district because the court
can protect the school system from unwanted intrusions from other bureau-
cracies. The difficulty lies with the practical determinations: What program
will disestablish a previous dual system? When and how do you determine
whether the effects of a dual system have been eliminated? What really com-
pensates an individual for past sins of discrimination? The courts have been
unable to answer these questions. 3 8
It is difficult to construct legislation that will remedy past violations be-
cause the courts, believing in achieving the ideal result, have considered,
tried, and eliminated so many programs that very little empirical data exists
for determining the success of any particular approach. 139 Desegregation
plans that are based solely on involuntary movement have largely failed. 140
Yet, despite this failed remedy and because of a desire to achieve the ideal
result, the courts began requiring other remedies, often very costly, which
attempted to prevent voluntary movement away from the segregation prob-
lem by creating programs so attractive that those with the ability to make
voluntary choices would choose to stay within the district.' 4' Again, these
programs have not been very successful.142 As educators became more ad-
136. For example, the then U.S. Secretary of Education Lamar Alexander said, "I cannot
think of anything as coercive in American life as telling people where they have to send their
children to school." Betsy White, Education Chief Defends Controversial School Choice Plan,
Alexander Reveals Details of Proposal, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 27, 1991, at A7. If it is
coercive to prohibit the freedom to choose, how can a school district's desegregation plan
succeed?
137. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 42 (1990).
138. It is a distinct possibility that these questions cannot be answered at all.
139. A good source of empirical data is Rossell, supra note 92.
140. See Treadwell, infra note 144.
141. More bluntly, magnet schools were created to attract white students from private
schools. See infra note 147, discussing the Kansas City schools.
142. The irony is that those who consider the programs the most successful are the whites
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ept at recognizing the effects of segregation and of identifying disparity in
achievement, the courts began fashioning remedies that ordered more re-
sources to be applied to programs directed at victims of segregation. 143
While not an overwhelming success, these remedies at least provide a closer
approximation of matching the remedy with the violation. 1 " The other im-
portant aspect of these compensatory programs is that they are also much
more likely to address the root causes of the sort of discrimination which is
producing this generation's segregation problem - segregation based on
wealth. 145
The final area found in most desegregation plans is a sophisticated moni-
toring program.' 46 The types of monitoring plans have varied but their es-
sential purpose regardless of the past violation has been: (1) quantify the
learning gap disparity so that the success or failure of any program can be
measured; (2) identify movements in the population which may ultimately
present segregative results; and (3) monitor compliance with desegregation
court orders. 147 This evolving remedy will make it impossible for Congress
to enact legislation that will guaranty the prescription of the ideal result
unless Congress can prohibit or prevent private acts of discrimination from
occurring. 148
for whom a remedy was not intended. Also, the minorities, for whom the remedy was in-
tended, were/are displaced from their neighborhood schools to make room for students who
are taking advantage of the voluntary programs.
143. Paul Holtzman, Symposium: Confronting the Challenge of Realizing Human Rights
Now, 34 How. L.J. 27 (1991).
144. Id.
145. Consider these facts:
1. "The median income among African-Americans remains only 59.4 percent
of whites, a slightly lower percentage than in 1970." David Treadwell,
Seeking a New Road to Equality; A Split Develops Among Blacks as Many
Question Whether Integration can Bridge the Gap with White America; Is the
Strategy of the 60's Outdated and Ineffective in the 90's, L.A. TIMES, July 7,
1992, at Al.
2. The share of blacks living in poverty, after dropping from more than half in
1959 to about one-third in 1969, has changed little since. Id.
3. While one-third of all blacks live below the poverty line, nearly forty-five
percent of black children are living in poverty. Holtzman, supra note 150.
146. William L. Christopher, Note, Ignoring the Soul of Brown: Board of Education v.
Dowell, 70 N.C. L. REV. 615 (1992).
147. See Id.
148. In Kansas City, a federal judge required the local school district to build "palatial new
schools" to attract white students voluntarily back into the district and ordered a tax increase
to pay for the construction. School Desegregation: Parents, Pundits and Experts Debate, HOT-
LINE, Apr. 13, 1992 [hereinafter Parents, Pundits and Experts]. Despite these new facilities,
few white students have returned to the district; only a commitment to achieving perfection
would justify such an order. Id.
In the Charlotte-Mecklenburg County North Carolina school district, where the busing
remedy gained notoriety, school officials are considering abandoning the twenty year-old bus-
ing plan in favor of a voluntary, magnet school plan. Robert A. Watts, Charlotte Schools May
End Busing; Officials Propose Magnet Programs, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 7, 1992, at A3.
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg County school district's motive behind changing to a voluntary
plan, however, is not to attract white students into the district but to limit busing, with which
the local patrons express dissatisfaction. Id. Since Charlotte-Mecklenburg's racial composi-
tion has remained stable for the past twenty years, implementing a voluntary plan may disrupt
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IV. THE PRACTICAL RESULT
A. WHY FREEMAN V. PITTS149 CHANGES THE LAW
Until recently,15 0 Congress had not attempted to enact an education plan
that would significantly affect local school activities. In part, this hands-off
approach is based on an attitude, which is supposedly based on a historical
notion that national government should not usurp local school authority.151
A review of federal legislation suggests, however, that Congress does not
believe that local school authorities have either the aptitude or wherewithal
to address the severity of educational problems in this country.1 52 As a re-
sult of the belief that local school authorities cannot fully address the scope
of the problem, Congress has enacted several programs which provide sup-
plementary aid to local government agencies.15 3
The Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with the power to enforce
the due process and equal protection guarantees against the states.' 5 4 Con-
sequently, if Congress enacted legislation based solely on this authority, it
should be constitutional.155 At issue is the extent to which Congress must
abide by the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 56
Presuming that Congress wants to abide by the relevant judicial interpreta-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment, any legislation seeking to alter the ju-
risdiction of the courts should provide programs that would be sufficient to
compensate victims of de jure segregation.' 57
Until Freeman, the Supreme Court had implicitly maintained that elimi-
nating vestiges of past discrimination was possible.1 58 With Freeman, the
an already acceptable racial mix under an educational policy that is the primary judicial rem-
edy in another district.
149. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
150. Former President George H.W. Bush's America 2000 legislation has been the most
dramatic attempt to change local school operations. America 2000, supra note 5.
151. See, e.g., Dayton 1, 433 U.S. at 410 (stating that "local autonomy of school districts is
a vital national tradition").
152. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 801(a) (1988).
The Congress finds that the rapid expansion of the Nation's urban areas and
urban population has caused severe problems in urban and suburban develop-
ment and created a national need to (1) provide special training in skills needed
for economic and efficient community development, and (2) support research in
new or improved methods of dealing with community development problems.
Id.
20 U.S.C. § 1221(e) ("While the direction of American education remains primarily the re-
sponsibility of State and local governments, the Federal Government has a clear responsibility
to provide leadership in the conduct and support of scientific inquiry into the educational
process.").
153. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 2911 (1988) (effective schools training); 20 U.S.C. § 2966 (1988)
(Blue Ribbon schools); and 20 U.S.C. § 2981 (1988) (Eisenhower scholarships for critical skills
improvement).
154. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
155. Cox, supra note 14, at 259.
156. See text accompanying notes 154-56.
157. Cox, supra note 14, at 259.
158. The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's holding that a school district must employ
"'heroic,' 'even bizarre' measures to attain racial balance when the imbalance is attributable
neither to the prior de jure system nor to a later violation by the school district but rather to
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Court adds a new qualifier in measuring whether a school district has met its
burden to desegregate - pragmatism.15 9 The Supreme Court shifted to a
more realistic approach for reasons that are both political and empirical.
For the first time since Brown was decided, the Court is composed of a solid,
so-called conservative bench which is under the direction of a Chief Justice
who consistently maintains the Court is both incapable of administering
schools and unable to develop the remedies for the constitutional violations
it has found. 160 In addition, the amount of research available on the success
and failure of desegregation litigation (which was only speculative at the
time of Brown) is enormous, but inconclusive.161 These studies have dramat-
ically changed the issues currently facing legislators, the courts, and school
administrators. 62
Under Brown, a school district that had a dual system of education in
1954 had a duty to disestablish and remove all vestiges of that dual system.
Only when a school district had effectively removed all vestiges of segrega-
tion would it have met this affirmative duty. Since Brown regarded the psy-
chological impact of segregation on a student as a basis for the constitutional
violation, it follows that removing adverse psychological impact would rem-
edy the constitutional violation. Yet, Freeman offers no proof that the vic-
tims of segregation are measurably better off than they were in 1954.
For example, the facts of Freeman resemble the situations in many other
Southern school districts. In 1969, the district court entered a consent order
approving a plan to dismantle the de jure segregation that had existed in the
Dekalb County, Georgia, School System (DCSS).163 The court "abolished
[a] freedom of choice plan and adopted a neighborhood school attendance
plan," which closed all of the former de jure black schools and reassigned
these students among the remaining neighborhood schools.'6 Then, be-
tween 1969 and 1986, judicial intervention was "infrequent and limited."' 65
In 1986, "DCSS sought a declaration that [it] had satisfied its duty to elimi-
nate the dual education system."' 166 DCSS sought this declaration on the
following facts: (1) "[t]he school system that the District Court ordered de-
segregated in 1969 had 5.6% black students" and "by 1986 the percentage of
black students was 47%;"167 (2) "the population of the northern half of
Dekalb County is now predominantly white and the southern half of Dekalb
County is predominantly black;"' 68 and (3) "50% of the black students at-
independent demographic forces." U.S.L.W. (BNA) Aug. 7, 1992 (quoting Pitts v. Freeman
887 F.2d 1438 (1 1th Cir. 1989)).
159. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446.
160. See Penick, 443 U.S. at 489-525 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
161. Parents, Pundits and Experts Debate, supra note 155.
162. See Cynthia Durcanin, Escape from the Killing Fields; Educators Debate Role of All-
Black Schools for Males, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 24, 1991, at Al; William Raspberry, Is
Segregation Really a Major National Problem?, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 17, 1992, at A 1.
163. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1436.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1437.
166. Id.




tended schools that were over 90% black [and] ... 27% of the white stu-
dents attended schools that were more than 90% white." 169  DCSS
countered these facts with the assertion that the 1969 order "effectively de-
segregated DCSS for a period of time."' 170
The primary issue for the Court was deciding whether a district court may
relinquish control of certain aspects of the desegregation litigation, and, if so,
when.171 The answer to this issue is not as significant as how the Court
answered it. First, the Court presented the reasons for the district court's
finding that DCSS had "accomplished maximum practical desegregation" in
its student assignment function.172 Then, Justice Kennedy recanted the
holdings in Brown I and H 173 without discussing whether the district court's
finding comports with either or both Brown I and II. The opinion makes its
first major departure from Brown. Justice Kennedy writes, "[w]e have said
that the court's end purpose must be to remedy the violation and in addition
to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system that is
operating in compliance with the Constitution."1 74 While the entire case
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1439.
171. Id. at 1442. As part of this determination, the Court reviewed the various factors
which determine unitary status. While Brown initially discussed the other aspects which might
affect the desegregation effort, its first priority was desegregating the student assignment func-
tion. Therefore, the subsidiary issues, including desegregating extra-curricular activities, are
not usually discussed in Supreme Court opinions. Freeman is different in this respect because
the test of establishing unitary status, as developed in Green, requires such an examination.
This Comment addresses only what the Freeman Court says is required to have achieved a
desegregated student assignment function.
172. Id. at 1440. The Court quoted this passage from the District Court's finding:
[The actions of DCSS] achieved maximum practical desegregation from 1969 to
1986. The rapid population shifts in Dekalb County were not caused by any
action on the part of the DCSS. These demographic shifts were inevitable as the
result of suburbanization, that is, work opportunities arising in DeKalb County
as well as the City of Atlanta, which attracted blacks to DeKalb; the decline in
the number of children born to white families during this period while the
number of children born to black families did not decrease; blockbusting of for-
merly white neighborhoods leading to selling and buying of real estate in the
DeKalb area on a highly dynamic basis; and the completion of Interstate 20,
which made access from DeKalb County into the City of Atlanta much eas-
ier .... There is no evidence that the school system's previous unconstitutional
conduct may have contributed to this segregation. This court is convinced that
any further actions taken by defendants, while the actions might have made
marginal adjustments in the population trends, would not have offset the factor
that were described above and the same racial segregation would have occurred
at approximately the same speed.
Id.
173. Id. at 1443. Justice Kennedy also quoted this passage from the Brown opinion:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction
of the law: for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denot-
ing the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motiva-
tion of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children
and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly]
integrated school system.
Id.
174. Id. at 1445.
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requires the Court to uphold a determination that a past constitutional viola-
tion has been remedied, the Court, nonetheless, never specifically addressed
it. Instead, the opinion asserted that equally important as achieving desegre-
gation is reaching the goal of "[r]etuming schools to the control of local
authorities at the earliest practicable date."'1 75 Then, as an aside, the Court
said that the measure of achieving a desegregated school system is deter-
mined not by whether the effort is effective but by whether the "school dis-
trict has demonstrated its commitment to a course of action that gives full
respect to the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.", 7 6 There-
fore, the Court requires only "maximum practical desegregation" (emphasis
added) and provides that the test is to "give particular attention to the
school system's record of compliance." 1 77
Does this mean that the nation must Wait until every school district has
relitigated all of its past sins before resuming control of its operations? Cer-
tainly, this is an option because, without initiating a massive study, it is rea-
sonable to believe that the justifications for other major urban southern cities
failing to fully desegregate are not much different than those in Atlanta,
Georgia.
In Freeman, the court made clear that it is willing to withdraw from
school desegregation cases. The Court's motives for this willingness are im-
material. What is material is that the Court will entertain arguments that
the federal courts' involvement in supervising school districts is coming to
an end.
B. THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990178
The most significant congressional alteration of the federal courts' power
to uniformly settle constitutional desegregation questions occurred with the
passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA).179 On its face,
CJRA is nothing more than an attempt to streamline dispute resolution in
civil cases. Beneath the surface, however, is the same theme developed in
Freeman v. Pitts: the practicality of judicial supervision is becoming an in-
creasingly important component in civil jurisprudence.
The weakness of the CJRA is the potential for uneven application of jus-
tice in desegregation cases.180 Many critics argue that this potential has al-
ways been present in school desegregation cases under the guise of
discretion. 81 The CJRA could, however, make the uneven application of
justice systematic; but, school desegregation litigation may or may not be
affected.
The strength of the CJRA is that it serves as a precedent for Congres-
sional alteration of federal court jurisdiction. Admittedly, Congress went
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1434.
178. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
179. DEBENEDICTIS, supra note 3, at 16.
180. Id.
181. See Penick, 443 U.S. at 525 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1994] 1913
SMU LAW REVIEW
through the back door and did not face the issue directly. Nonetheless, the
potential for one district court to adopt a plan that operates differently from
another district court is present.' 8 2 Accompanying this potential difference
is the possibility that similarly situated claimants will not enjoy the same
process for adjudication of their claim.18 3 Even though Congress did not
attempt to dictate the result in a pending case, the implementation of CJRA
will likely have that effect. Therefore, CJRA stands for the proposition that
a proper attempt to prescribe a result in a case may be couched in terms of
promoting judicial efficiency.
As part of any legislation to alter federal court jurisdiction over school
desegregation cases, Congress should include, as a basis for the legislation,
the national interest in improving the federal courts' ability to manage their
caseload. Incident to promoting judicial efficiency is an effort to improve
communication between the three branches of government.184 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, at the beginning of each new session of Congress, informs legisla-
tors of issues facing the federal judiciary. 8 5 In his 1991 year-end report on
the federal judiciary, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "[m]odest curtailment
of federal jurisdiction is important." 8 6
Determining whether Congress is willing to accept the Chief Justice's re-
quest to curtail federal court jurisdiction, particularly in school desegrega-
tion cases, is purely speculative. Yet, with school desegregation continuing
to consume extensive judicial and local government resources and with little
proof of educational improvement,187 school desegregation is an ideal candi-
date for reform, especially from a judicial efficiency perspective. Reform
carries with it risks, particularly since Congress has, until recently, spent
significant energy fighting the courts rather than trying to provide equal edu-
cational opportunities.18 8
V. CONCLUSION
In declaring that "we must resolve - if not today, then soon . . ." the
continuation of judicial supervision of school districts, 8 9 it is unclear who
"we" is. It probably means that "we" the Supreme Court of the United
States must develop new law to provide federal courts and school districts
with sufficient guidance to end litigation with certainty. If the Court believes
that this is possible, the Court is making the same mistake made by the
Warren Court in believing that Brown v. Board of Education would end seg-
regation. As long as the Supreme Court is the primary policy maker for
educational equality issues, local school officials and federal district courts
182. DEBENEDICTIS, supra note 3, at 16.
183. Id.
184. 138 CONG. REC. E811 (Mar. 25, 1992) (remarks of Mr. Hughes).
185. Id. at E812.
186. Id.; see also 138 CONG. REC. E746 (Mar. 1992) (remarks of Mr. Smith).
187. See supra notes 92 and 152 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 14 and 24 and accompanying text.
189. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1450 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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will never know how to apply specific facts to broad legal, and implicitly
social, theories.
If "we" means Congress or the people of the United States, however, then
everyone should be on notice that elected officials will have primary control
over educational equality or the lack thereof. Which entity steps forward to
assume the role that the federal courts have played in the last thirty years
will go a long way in the attempt to end federal court supervision of schools.
Congress has suggested that it will boldly go where no Congress has gone
before. If this is the case, Congress should assume the role envisioned by the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to legislate and enforce equal protec-
tion. Once Congress accepts this responsibility, an attempt to remove juris-
diction from the federal courts will be more palatable, and the courts will be
more apt to defer to the superior fact finding ability of Congress. If the
reform movement seeks to return absolute control over local school activities
to local governments, then expect bitter legal battles fought by those who
suffered the most from the decisions made by local governments and who
believe the federal courts are the only enforcers of equal protection.
Throughout this comment, I strove to avoid typically liberal or conserva-
tive positions for two reasons:
(1) The conservative political dogma typically ignores the fact that a
significant number of black people continue to attend racially iden-
tifiable, inferior schools; and
(2) The liberal political dogma refuses to admit that Court intervention
has not produced lasting and meaningful improvement.
Once it is conceded that the courts' role in desegregation litigation is ineffec-
tive, then the question of who will protect against unequal education is im-
portant. The choices are few. One choice is to return to local government
control, which the Court prefers. This approach is problematic because:
(1) local government recalcitrance in large part perpetuated the current
mess; and (2) the link between educational excellence and national interests
is so great that incongruity between local and national interests will impede
progress for both interests. A second possibility is not to change any-
thing.190 Let the courts continue to plod along for another thirty years. If a
Freeman-type Court remained on the bench for that long, then perhaps the
remaining desegregation cases would end.
A third possibility is for Congress to assume the role intended for it in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Even though political passions might cloak educa-
tional facts in the debate, at least Congress would be solely responsible for
the success or failure of the educational system. Now it is impossible to
determine upon whom to place credit or blame.
190. There are, of course, other possibilities. One is the creation of a constitutional right to
education. See Susan H. Bitensky, Legal Theory: Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Edu-
cation Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis,
86 Nw. U. L. REV. 550 (1992).
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